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Abstract 
We examine the implications of tax and subsidy policies for employment in the “three worlds 
of welfare”, Anglo-Saxon, Continental European and Scandinavian. We argue that home 
production is key to a proper evaluation of the employment outcomes. Anglo-Saxon low-
support policies encourage more overall market employment. Continental transfer policies 
encourage more home production in services with close substitutes at home. Scandinavian 
policies give incentives to move home production in social services to the market but 
discourage other service activity. We find support for our claims in sectoral employment data 
for five representative countries, United States, Britain, France, Italy and Sweden. 
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1 Introduction
There are large diﬀerences across countries in the total number of market hours of work
and in their distribution across sectors of economic activity and persons. Figure 1 shows
total employment for OECD countries as a percentage of the population of working age.
Even excluding Turkey, where employment rates are below 50 per cent, employment
rates range from about 55 per cent to over 75 per cent. Most of this variation is due to
employment rates for women. Figure 2 shows the employment rates for women. In the
Scandinavian countries female employment rates are over 70 per cent, whereas in the
Mediterranean countries and some East European countries they range between 40 and
50 per cent.
Some of these diﬀerences in employment rates are due to unemployment diﬀerences.
But unemployment is not the whole story. Unemployment rates in the OECD rarely
exceed 12-15 per cent of the labour force, and if they do it is only for short periods of
time, whereas employment gaps are larger and more persistent. There has been a large
amount of work aiming to explain unemployment diﬀerences in terms of diﬀerences in
institutions across countries, and their role in the transmission of shocks to the labour
market, but much less has been written for employment.1 Our focus in this paper is
welfare policy and employment diﬀerences. Although the welfare state is an important
“institution” in the work on shocks and institutions across the OECD, our starting point
is a related literature that attributes employment diﬀerences to diﬀerences in taxes.2
We claim that although taxes do have an impact on decisions that have to do with the
allocation of hours of work, their full impact can only be understood if the way the
revenue from them is spent is also modelled and if due attention is paid to the type of
market work that is taxed.3 In particular, taxes will have a bigger impact on a particular
economic activity if that activity has untaxed alternatives and they will have a bigger
impact on a particular person’s labour supply if that person has alternative uses of time
that yield approximately the same marginal utility as market work.
We outline a model of the allocation of time to three uses, market work, home produc-
tion and leisure, and show how the availability of close substitutes in home production
increases the impact of taxes on market work. We model the impact of both taxes and
expenditure associated with welfare policies. In order to do this we make use of two
sectoral databases, the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) and the European
Union’s EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts (KLEMS). We show that taxes
and expenditure have a large impact on the allocation of time to sectors that have close
substitutes in home production, such as social work and unskilled services. But their im-
pact is less in other sectors, such as manufacturing industry. The fact that more women
are employed in the sectors that have the close home substitutes may also explain why
the biggest diﬀerences in the allocation of time to the market are by women.
1See Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) and Blanchard (2006) for summaries of results and updates
on unemployment diﬀerences. For an example of work aiming to explain relative employment patterns
in terms of institutions see Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2007).
2See Prescott (2004) for the main claim and Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Rogerson (2006) and Faggio
and Nickell (2007) for related work.
3Similar claims about the importance of expenditure are made by Rogerson (2007) and Ragan (2005).
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Our focus are the policy diﬀerences in the “three worlds of welfare capitalism,”
(Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999): the Anglo-Saxon countries, with low taxes and trans-
fers; continental Europe, with higher taxes and transfers; and Scandinavia, which, in
the words of Lindbeck (1988, 1997), has “nationalized the family” with large market
subsidies targeted to functions traditionally done within the family. We document the
diﬀerences in time allocations in five representative countries, the United States, Britain,
France, Italy and Sweden. They are all major countries that span the range of employ-
ment diﬀerences and belong to diﬀerent clusters in the three worlds of welfare capitalism.
Two are the main Anglo-Saxon countries, two are in the continental/southern European
block, and the final is the leading Scandinavian country.
We find some striking diﬀerences in the allocation of time across economic activities,
all of which concern service employment. Whereas employment outside the service
sectors has converged in all countries to a low level of about 17% of the working age
population, service employment rates range from about 60% in the United States to 40%
in Italy. We do a decomposition of the diﬀerences in service employment rates (and hours
of work) at the 2-digit industrial level and find that although - as one might expect - there
are large diﬀerences between the Anglo-Saxon countries and the continental European
countries in the size of the finance and business services sector, this is not the whole
story. There are also large diﬀerences in employment in other sectors, in particular in
the sectors which have close substitutes in “home production”, such as childcare, looking
after sick relatives and cooking and shopping.
Our focus is on the role of the state in explaining these diﬀerences in the allocation
of time. Intuitively, our approach is that if an individual has the choice of either buy-
ing services in the market, or spending more time at home to produce similar services,
she might choose the home if prices in the market are high. Government policy aﬀects
relative prices in a variety of ways, and through this channel influences household allo-
cations between the home and the market. We study the role of this policy channel in
generating diﬀerences in time allocations in the five countries in our sample.
In order to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent channels, we divide the economy into sec-
tors which can be classified into three broad groups. In the first group we put all sectors
that produce goods like manufactures or highly specialized business services, which can
either be produced in the market or foregone altogether. In the second group we put
health and social care, services which, if not bought in the market, could be produced
to some extent at home. In the final group we have services such as cooking and clean-
ing, the traditional “home production” sectors, whose outputs are services which can be
produced either in the market or by household members at home.
In the first “world of welfare capitalism”, which in our sample includes the United
States and Britain, we would expect to see large employment levels in all sectors and
less home production time because of low taxation and regulation of market activity. In
the second world of welfare capitalism, in our sample France and Italy, there is higher
taxation and regulation, so we would expect to see low employment in the first group of
sectors, and especially low employment in sectors 2 and 3, compensated by higher home
production time. In the third world of welfare capitalism, represented in our study by
Sweden, we would expect to see low employment in the first group of sectors because
of high taxes, especially low employment in the third group of sectors compensated by
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high home production time, but higher employment in the social care sector, because of
the “nationalization” of the family - the elaborate system of support for market services
connected with childcare and social work. We show that the broad employment trends
in the data are consistent with these predictions.
Section 2 gives a brief preview of our approach to the problem of evaluating the
employment implications of welfare policies and section 3 summarizes employment and
hours of work in the five countries in our sample, making use of the KLEMS data set.
Section 4 outlines our model of employment allocations with policy and draws out the
policy predictions. Section 5 describes the main policy variables in the three worlds of
welfare capitalism, making use mainly of the OECD’s social expenditure database and
presents a number of graphs that provide support for our arguments.
2 Brief description of the model and methodology
Our principal claim is that taxes and subsidies associated with welfare and other policies
influence market economic activity diﬀerently in diﬀerent sectors of the economy. The
reason for the diﬀerence is that the impact that policy has on market activity depends
on the alternatives that are available to the consumer. Loosely speaking, it depends on
the demand elasticities for the output of each market activity. In the classic textbook
case of the allocation of time between work and leisure the alternative to market activity
is leisure time. The extent to which the individual withdraws hours from market activity
when it is taxed depends on the elasticity of substitution between the aggregate final
good produced by market work and leisure time. If the individual does not consider the
taking of leisure a good substitute for consuming market-produced goods, taxes do not
have a big impact on the number of market hours. In such cases the demand for the
output of market time is inelastic.
We believe that when the only choices available are between market time and leisure
time the elasticities of substitution are indeed small, and so the impact of taxation on
market time is also small. However, a bigger impact is obtained when we consider a
third use of time, home production.4 Home-production time is work time spent either
at home or elsewhere, so it does not yield direct utility. For utility purposes it is treated
as market time. But the consumption of the output of home production time yields
utility. The diﬀerence between the output of market time and the output of home time
is that the latter is produced by the individual for her own use, or for the use of family
members. It is not sold to someone else. Normally there is also a requirement that
no part at all of the output of home production time is sold in the market, which is
a stronger condition than the one just stated. For example, the farmer who consumes
part of his produce is considered to be engaged in market activity and buying some of
his output for his own use. But this principle is not applied to services because of the
diﬃculty of distinguishing between home and market time in the data. For example,
is the tax accountant who does her annual tax return on a weekend engaged in market
4Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) make a similar claim about the role of home production
over the business cycle. Freeman and Schettkat (2005) find microeconomic evidence supporting our
substitution claims.
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Table 1:
Economic sectors and their composition
production and business services health other services
agriculture
and allied
wholesale trade
health and
social work
sale, motor repairs
retail trade
mining and
quarrying
air transport,
post and telecom
hotels and
restaurants
manufacturing
finance, insurance,
real estate and
business services
inland transport
water transport
aux. transport
gas, electricity,
water
education
refuse disposal
recreational,
other personal
construction
membership
organizations,
media activities
public admin.
and defence,
soc. security
All economic sectors in KLEMS are included except for the sector private households with employed
persons, which is excluded from the analysis because of apparent inconsistencies in the data.
production but the lawyer who spends her time in exactly the same way engaged in
home production? In time use surveys the time spent by each will be counted as home
production time.
What type of activities are done in the home and which sectors of economic activity
are likely to be aﬀected by it? Historically many families produced food and other goods
at home, through back-yard cultivation, the rearing of small animals and the making of
clothes. But such production activities ceased to attract home time in modern industrial
societies a long time ago.5 In contemporary societies all home production goods are
goods traditionally classified as services. Moreover, even within services, only services
that do not require special skills can be done in the home. The main entries for home
production time in modern time use surveys are shopping, childcare and other family
care, cooking and cleaning.6 These are all low-skill services that can be done by non-
specialists. Business services such as the ones done by accountants, lawyers or real estate
agents are not ones that have close substitutes in home production.
We therefore divide industrial sectors into two: manufacturing and business services,
which have no substitutes in home production, and all other services, which have sub-
stitutes in home production. But given our interest in policy, we should also draw a
5The historical literature on home production is reviewed briefly in Ngai and Pissarides (2008).
6See Robinson and Godbey (1997) for extensive discussion of the American data and Burda, Hamer-
mesh and Weil (2008) for a good study of some European countries.
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distinction between sectors that are treated diﬀerently by policy within the two groups.
The policy instruments that we study are the three main types of taxes, income tax,
expenditure tax and employment (payroll) tax, employment subsidies (active labour
market policies) and the subsidies associated with social policy. Partly because it is
not possible to distinguish between the sectoral allocations of the taxes and employment
subsidies, partly because of realism, we assume that all sectors are equally exposed to the
first four instruments of policy, the three taxes and the employment subsidies. But social
subsidies, when given in the form of goods, belong to the health and social care sector.7
Thus, our service sectors are further subdivided into the health and social sectors on
the one hand and other (low-skill) services on the other. Table 1 gives the two-digit
classification of our three sectors. The biggest employment share in the other services
category is retailing, which accounts for about 40% of the sector. Retailing is also the
biggest single home production activity in time use surveys.8 We include government
employment in administration, defence and compulsory social security in business ser-
vices, although in the model it is treated separately from the market sectors, being one
whose wages are financed from taxation.
Next a decision has to be made about what social transfers to include as subsidies to
the health and social care sector. Our approach is to isolate some transfers as subsidies
and include all other government expenditure in a single category of “lump sum trans-
fers”.9 Employment subsidies include the entry “active labour market programmes” in
SOCX. Social subsidies include the following “benefits in kind”: old age, incapacity-
related benefits, and family. The main expenditure are on maintaining and running
retirement homes, invalidity services and childcare services, all of which have close home
substitutes.
3 Hours of work and employment across five coun-
tries
Although it is possible to construct time series data for all our variables since 1980, in
this paper we focus on the cross-country diﬀerences in policies and outcomes. We do this
as a first step towards the fuller understanding of employment and hours dynamics. As
we show in Table 2, the changes that have taken place in hours of work and employment
rates since the mid 1970s are of about the same order of magnitude as the cross-country
diﬀerences in outcomes. For example, if we were to compare the United States with
France, in the first decade in Table 2 US hours exceed French hours by 1, but in the
7Social subsides that are given in the form of unconditional transfers, e.g., in the form of income
support or cash benefits for children but without conditions on how to spend it, are a separate category
that is akin to lump sum transfer than subsidization of a particular sector.
8Retailing is not the typical example of home production that usually springs to mind. However,
shopping time is a big fraction of home production time and it is obviously influenced by the number
of employees in the retailing industry. In a country with more shops, more employees per square meter
of retail space and longer opening times shopping time per item bought should be lower.
9In Prescott (2004) all tax revenue is treated as a lump sum transfer back to taxpayers. Ragan
(2006) and Rogerson (2007) distinguish between diﬀerent spending patterns.
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Table 2:
Weekly hours of work and employment rates for population of working age, 15-64 years
hours of work employment rates
period US UK FR IT SW US UK FR IT SW
1975-1984 23.5 24.6 22.5 22.0 23.6 66.5 68.5 63.6 57.4 78.4
1985-1994 25.1 23.7 19.5 21.5 24.1 71.8 68.6 59.8 55.4 77.9
1995-2004 25.6 23.8 18.9 21.2 22.8 72.4 70.1 61.6 54.6 71.4
last decade they exceed them by 6.8. We could either explain this as a cross-sectional
diﬀerence of 6.8 hours in 1995-2004 or as a diﬀerence in the 30-year dynamic evolutions
of about the same order of magnitude. Here we focus on the former dimension of the
problem - given the economic environment in the last ten years of data, to what extent
can taxes and subsidies associated with the welfare state account for the cross-sectional
diﬀerences in employment outcomes? Of course, a model that claims to explain the
cross-country diﬀerences in labour market outcomes should be able to explain them
both in 1980 and 2004. But a study of the dynamics of hours or employment needs to
allow variations across time and countries in more than welfare policies. In our view the
most pressing need is to construct technology (TFP) time series for individual sectors,
since, as we have shown in Ngai and Pissarides (2007), technology drives substitutions
between home and sectorial market allocations over time. This is outside the scope of
this paper.10
Some issues need to be discussed before we take a closer look at the recent data.
Should we be looking at hours of work or employment rates? The hours of work that
we report in Table 2 are total weekly hours divided by the population of working age,
irrespective of their employment status. Of course, total hours are given by the product
of employment and average hours of work for employed persons, so the picture that
hours tell will be diﬀerent from the one that employment tells only when employed
persons work on average diﬀerent hours across countries. This is the case in important
cases in the data shown in Table 2. The most striking diﬀerences involve France, which
has experienced a bigger fall in weekly hours than any other country. Comparing for
example France and Italy, Italians work more hours but have lower employment rate.
That means that employed Italians work much longer per week than employed French
workers do.
One needs a model to explain such diﬀerences in the allocation of worktime between
hours and persons. Our model is not designed to deal with this issue, so we cannot
address it in an informed way. We conduct our analysis in terms of a representative agent
of the working age population who decides to split her time between three activities,
work in the market, work at home and leisure. For this reason, the variable that is
closest to our analysis is the average number of hours of work for a typical person in the
10If we are right in claiming that technology is a driver for the evolution in hours allocations, then
the closer the level of technological development in the countries in our sample the more justified we are
in focusing on the partial question of the impact of policy on allocations. This guided to some extent
the choice of countries and time period for our cross-sectional analysis.
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Table 3:
Annual hours diﬀerences for population of working age, 15-64 years
absolute diﬀerences log diﬀerences
sector US-UK US-FR US-IT US-SW US-UK US-FR US-IT US-SW
industry etc. 95 245 195 122 4.8 13.7 10.4 6.2
health soc. care 3 8 56 −59 1.0 3.1 30.0 −18.6
other services −6 101 19 79 −0.8 17.6 2.8 13.0
total 92 354 269 141 3.3 13.3 8.2 5.1
population of working age. But because employment rates are more intuitive and they
are usually the focus of policy (such as the European Union Lisbon targets) we will also
give some data for employment rates.
Of course, if we were to find that on average the number of hours of market work,
home work and leisure are about the same - which is not far oﬀ the truth if sleep
and preparation time are ignored - this does not mean that each and every person of
working age splits her time equally between the three activities. There is specialization
within the household based on comparative advantage. We ignore this specialization,
and aggregate the time spend by diﬀerent household members into a representative-
agent time allocation. Given, however, well known patterns in comparative advantage,
we can discuss less formally whether the main eﬀects that we identify are likely to aﬀect
men or women.
How do diﬀerences in hours of work across our countries compare with employment
diﬀerences and participation diﬀerences? The log diﬀerence between hours of work in
the United States and hours in each of the four European countries is, respectively,
3.3, 13.3, 8.2 and 5.1. The employment diﬀerentials are, respectively, 2.5, 11.1, 18.1 and
0.9. So in the cross-sectional comparison the divergencies between the two relate more to
Italy and Sweden than to France. In Italy hours per worker are longer than in the United
States, so the employment diﬀerential far exceeds the hours diﬀerential. In Sweden the
opposite is true, so the hours diﬀerential exceeds the employment diﬀerential by a large
margin. The participation rate diﬀerentials, obtained by adding the employment and
unemployment rates for each country, are, respectively, 1.5, 5.5, 12.7 and −1.3. So they
are smaller than the employment diﬀerentials, as one might expect because of the higher
unemployment rates in Europe, and in the case of Sweden participation exceeds that of
the United States.
We now focus on the diﬀerences in hours of work. Table 3 shows the distribution of
the diﬀerences in hours across the three sectors that we study. We report both absolute
diﬀerences and log diﬀerences, and because the absolute numbers involved in weekly
hours are small, we report diﬀerences in annual hours by multiplying the weekly hours
by 52 and then rounding to the nearest integer. The absolute numbers are reported to
show where the biggest diﬀerences in hours of work are across countries. However, the
models used to explain diﬀerences in the supply of labour are not usually linear, so the
prediction of the impact of taxes is not linear either. In the model of this paper taxes
have proportional (log-linear) eﬀects on the hours allocated in each sector, so the log
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Table 4:
Annual hours diﬀerences in industry and business services
sector US-UK US-FR US-IT US-SW
industry −4 41 −64 −4
FIRE −6 68 94 84
wholesale trade 10 30 16 4
air trans &com. −2 8 13 2
education 14 15 37 −13
org. activities 41 45 47 17
government 42 15 46 26
diﬀerences between hours allocations are more likely to capture the relative impact of
policy.
Looking at the absolute diﬀerences in Table 3 it is clear that the biggest diﬀerences in
hours of work in the countries of our sample are in the first sector. This, however, is due
to the large size of that sector. In terms of the log diﬀerences other sectors dominate.
Notable features of the diﬀerences include the very similar distribution between US and
UK hours; the far greater allocation of hours in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in
France in all economic activities except health and social care; the far greater allocation
of hours in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in Italy in health and social care; and the
larger number of hours allocated to health and social care in Sweden than elsewhere.
In the model in this paper the only diﬀerences that we consider across the countries
in our sample are in their tax and subsidy polices. For this reason, and given what
we said in the preceding section, our model cannot tell us how the diﬀerences in the
distribution of hours within the first sector can be explained. Nevertheless, and mainly
to prepare the ground for future work, we report in Table 4 a more detailed breakdown
of the diﬀerences in hours within the first sector. We report only the absolute diﬀerences
since we do not apply the model to these diﬀerentials.
Italy allocates more hours to manufacturing and other production industries than
all the other countries, a sign perhaps that it is behind in the industrialization process
that eventually diminishes the industrial sector. Finance, insurance and real estate
accounts for a large fraction of the diﬀerences, with the notable exception of Britain,
which employs more hours in this sector due to its large financial sector based in the City
of London. But perhaps the most notable diﬀerence between the United States and the
European countries in this comparison is in the size of government and “organizational
activities”. These activities include all activities connected with the political process,
such as lobbying of politicians, representing professional or ethnic groups in politics,
trade unions etc. Together with government, these two sub-sectors account for a large
fraction of the diﬀerences in hours between the US and the European countries (in the
case of Britain they account for 90 per cent of the diﬀerence). In order to understand
why there is so much more employment in the United States in these sectors we need a
political economy model, which we do not have here. But it is certainly an important
topic for future work in explaining employment diﬀerences across countries.
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4 The model
Preliminaries. Our theoretical model builds on the decompositions that we discussed
in the preceding section. Figure 3 shows the way preferences are structured. Market
goods are produced in all three sectors but home-produced goods are substitutes only
for sectors 2 and 3. Our approach to solving for the time allocations is to solve first the
consumer problem as a static maximization problem for a representative consumer with
labour income w and no assets. We assume that all production functions are linear in
labour, so there are no profits in equilibrium and all income is in the form of wages. We
first obtain demand functions for all goods and subsequently obtain the time allocations
from the demand functions and the production functions.
Government taxes or subsidizes market activities, makes implicit or explicit transfers
to consumers, spends on final goods and employs labour. We assume that each market
good is taxed at a rate ti, which can be either positive or negative. In all sectors other
than health and social care, ti is common and equal to the expenditure tax (value added
tax). The tax on health and social care, however, is net of the subsidy. The way the tax
and subsidy are combined depends on the way that policy is structured. In the formal
model we assume that there is a net tax rate t2 that applies to the health and social
sector only. For convenience of exposition we write also t1 and t3 for the VAT tax on
the other two goods. Wage income is taxed at rate τ , which, as with goods taxes, is a
proportional tax.
Governments make large per capita transfers, which we denote by T. Transfers include
direct transfers, such as invalidity benefits, child benefits and the like, and goods and
services bought or produced by the government and given to consumers either free or
for a subsidized price, such as education and health. This assumption requires that
goods bought or produced by the government are not in excess of what consumers
would have bought, had they faced a free choice. If the representative consumer tops up
government goods with her own demand, the marginal cost of additional consumption
to the consumer is still the price plus the expenditure tax and the government transfer
is equivalent to a lump-sum transfer. But obviously, if the government oﬀered goods at
zero price in excess of what the consumer would have bought at market prices, and there
was no market for the resale of these goods, then the government’s policy would amount
to more than a lump-sum transfer. It would involve the subsidization of the sector that
produces the good that is transferred. We do not take up this possibility.11
Government employment is added to the appropriate sector (e.g., government em-
ployment in education is added to the private education sector) and government em-
ployment in administration, defence and compulsory social security is assumed to yield
utility separately from other consumer goods. We assume that government pays the
11The only “good” that one might argue that is oﬀered in free supply is health, in countries that
have a free health programme. But we doubt whether this is correct. Although consumers can get
basic health care at zero cost in many countries, including some in our sample, there is also demand for
private care in all our countries. Even in the absence of private care, a large increase in the demand
for health care in countries with a national health service is met with long waiting lines, rationing of
care according to urgency, and the like, which are equivalent to a shadow price that may well match
the cost in private care for the representative agent.
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same wages as the private sector, so we can ignore government employment in the con-
sumer maximization problem. We treat government employment as a perfect substitute
for private employment and the goods produced by government within each sector as
perfect substitutes for the private goods in the sector. As we show below, under these
assumptions the value of all goods either bought from the private sector or produced
by government is equivalent to a lump-sum transfer to consumers. But spending on
the wages of government employees is not equivalent to a transfer because it is paid in
return for the sale of time, which yields utility to the worker. This implies that gov-
ernment spending on the wages of employees in the administrative civil service, defence
and compulsory social security is not part of the transfer from the government to the
private sector.
Our objective in this paper is to construct a tax-subsidy variable for each of our
sectors, which we call the “tax wedge”. The form that the tax wedge takes is dictated
by the model, so we need to derive optimal decisions to arrive at the correct formula for
the tax wedge. Following this we give the correlations between the sector’s tax wedge
and the cross-sectional allocations of hours of work, both in the market and the home.
For the latter we need to use time use data, which we discuss after the development of
the model.
The consumer problem. We assume a constant elasticity of substitution at each level
of consumption shown in figure 3. At the top level preferences are given by
U (c, lm, lh, g) = ln c+ v(1− lm − lh) + vg(g), (1)
where c is a consumption aggregate, lm is market work, lh is home work and g is the
consumption of government goods that have no substitutes in private production (admin-
istration and defence). v(.) is the utility of leisure and vg(.) the utility of government
production. Aggregate consumption is a CES aggregate of consumption at the next
level,
c =
∙
3P
i=1
ωic˜
(ε−1)/ε
i
¸ε/(ε−1)
, (2)
where ε ≥ 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution and c˜i is a composite good of
market produce and home produced goods in each sector i. In sector 1 the composite c˜1
is the market good c1, which the consumer buys at price (1 + t1)p1. In sectors 2 and 3
it is a CES aggregate of market and home produced goods,
c˜i =
h
ψic
(σi−1)/σi
i + (1− ψi)c
(σi−1)/σi
ih
iσi/(σi−1)
, (3)
where cih is the amount produced at home and σi ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between home and market production. We argued in Ngai and Pissarides (2007, 2008)
that the elasticity of substitution ε is likely to be a very small number but the elasticities
σi are likely to be fairly large (say 1.5 to 2.5). The reason is that whereas consumers do
not substitute easily one good for another when the goods are defined broadly (e.g., all
manufacturing goods versus all services) consumers are less picky when deciding whether
to consume goods bought in the market or similar goods produced at home (e.g., home
cooked food versus restaurant food).
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Market work yields income which is spent buying goods at given prices. Because of
perfect labour mobility between sectors, consumers are indiﬀerent about the sector they
enter as workers, so in the utility function we enter market work for the representative
consumer as an aggregate lm. All government employment is part of lm. Work at home
is divided into l2h and l3h according to the sector in which it is allocated. In order to
clarify the role of government employment and purchases of goods and services, suppose
government either buys or produces goods cig for each i = 1, 2, 3, and gives them free to
households. Then the budget constraint is
3P
i=1
(1 + ti)pi(ci − cig) ≤ (1− τ)w (lm + lh) + T0 (4)
where T0 are direct transfers. Define a generalized transfer from the government to the
representative agent T = T0+
P3
i=1(1 + ti)picig to obtain the more conventional budget
constraint
3P
i=1
(1 + ti)pici ≤ (1− τ)w(lm + lh) + T. (5)
Thus, the government transfer includes direct transfers associated with the welfare state
and all government spending on goods and services, but excludes direct subsidies condi-
tional on spending on particular goods, which are part of the ti,12 and spending on the
wages of employees used to produce the government good g, which is part of wlm.
Home production functions are linear so the constraints on home production are
cjh ≤ Ajhljh, j = 2, 3. (6)
Write now l for total work, i.e., the sum of lm and lh. The consumer’s “total” income is
(1− τ)wl. We can write the budget constraint as
3P
i=1
(1 + ti)pici ≤ (1− τ)wl − (1− τ)w(l2h + l3h) + T. (7)
Making use of the production constraints in (6) this becomes
3P
i=1
(1 + ti)pici +
3P
i=2
pihcih ≤ (1− τ)wl + T, (8)
where pih = (1− τ)w/Aih for sectors 2 and 3 is a net implicit price for home produced
goods. The numerator is the net wage that the household could get by supplying one
unit of labour to the market and the denominator is the number of units of the home
good that she could get by supplying the same unit to home production.
The consumer problem has now become the conventional problem of maximizing the
utility function in (1)-(3) subject to the single constraint (8). We do not derive results
12The essential diﬀerence between the transfer component of government expenditure and the subsidy
is that in the case of the transfer the consumer has no choice how much she gets, the government
decides. In the case of the subsidy the consumer can get more of it by consuming more of the good
that is subsidized.
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explicitly but state some of the more interesting ones that can be compared to the data
for the five countries in our sample.
The demand for leisure. The demand for leisure is given by the condition:
1
v0 (1− l) − l =
T
(1− τ)w. (9)
This equation brings out clearly the role of policy in the determination of overall work.
If there are no lump-sum transfers, T = 0, then total work time depends only on the
preference parameters in the v (.) function. The choice of leisure is constant, as in the
standard model with log utility. Importantly, this result shows that once T = 0, total
work time and leisure are independent of the level of wage income and relative tax rates,
so workers with diﬀerent skills should choose to work the same number of hours. But
even in this case, their allocations between market and home may diﬀer. If T 6= 0
workers of diﬀerent incomes and skills choose diﬀerent allocations between total work
and leisure. With positive transfers consumers with higher net wages work more hours
and all consumers in countries with higher income taxes or transfers work fewer hours.
Marketization. We next solve for the “marketization” of consumption. The com-
posite good c˜j can be acquired by buying some cj from the market at price pj, or by
producing it at home as cjh at a unit cost of pjh. How does the consumer choose the
division of c˜j between cj and cjh, or equivalently, how much of cjh does she marketize?
The answer to this question is obtained from the maximization of (3) subject to a given
allocation c˜j and it is:
cjh
cj
=
µ
ψj
1− ψj
pjh
(1 + tj) pj
¶−σj
j = 2, 3. (10)
Recalling that pjh = (1 − τ)w/Ajh, it follows that consumers marketize more of the
home-produced good if they have higher net wages, if the market good is cheaper or
if labour productivity in home production is lower. The impact of these parameters
depends on the elasticity of substitution between the goods. If the market good is a
very poor substitute for the home good the goods are consumed, in the limit , in fixed
proportions. But if home and market goods are good substitutes for each other there
could be a lot of diﬀerences in the marketization of home production across individuals,
countries or over time, depending on the values taken by taxes and market prices. These
are predictable properties and we return to them later.
Relative demand for market goods. We next solve for the relative demand for market
goods, which we use to get market employment shares. The standard condition on the
marginal rate of substitution between any goods i and j applies, so we first calculate the
MRS between good 1, which is only a market good, and one of the other goods, denoted
j. Diﬀerentiation of the utility function with respect to c1 and cj (j = 2, 3) yields the
MRS
∂U/∂c1
∂U/∂cj
=
ω1
ωj
ψσj(1−ε)/ε(σj−1)x1/ε−1/σjj
µ
c1
cj
¶−1/ε
(11)
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where xj is derived from (3):
c˜j = cjψ
σj/(σj−1)
j
"
1 +
µ
1− ψj
ψj
¶µ
cjh
cj
¶(σj−1)/σj#σj/(σj−1)
≡ cjψσj/(σj−1)j xj. (12)
It follows that the relative demand for market goods is given by
c1
cj
= Bε
µ
(1 + t1)p1
(1 + tj)pj
¶−ε
x1−ε/σjj , (13)
where B stands for the preference parameters in (11). Given the marketization condition
(10) this gives the two relative demands in terms of relative prices, policy parameters and
preference parameters. The relative demand for market good 1 is a decreasing function
of its relative price and, under the plausible restriction ε ≤ σj, a decreasing function of
the extent of marketization of the alternative good.
The allocation of time. We can now use the conditions for the relative demands, (10)
and (13), to obtain predictions about the allocation of time to alternative uses. For this
we need to use the production functions and market clearing. The home production
functions are given in (6). We assume also linear production functions for market goods,
ci = Ailim, where Ai is a technology parameter and lim is the market time used to
produce good i. The revenue from good i is used to pay for wages and employment taxes
net of subsidies. Denote the net employment tax rate by te. Free mobility of labour
implies that wages are the same in all market sectors, so relative market prices are given
by the ratio of the technology parameters:
(1 + te)w = piAi =⇒
pi
pj
=
Aj
Ai
. (14)
The relative price of the market good to the implicit price of the home good is also
obtained from (14) and the condition pjh = (1− τ)w/Ajh :
(1 + tj)pj
pjh
=
(1 + tj)(1 + te)w/Aj
(1− τ)w/Ajh
=
(1 + tj)(1 + te)Ajh
(1− τ)Aj
. (15)
Returning to the relative demand equations we can now use (10) to get a simple
log-linear relation for the marketization of time in sector j :
ljh
lj
=
µ
Ajh
Aj
¶σj−1µ1− ψj
ψj
(1 + tj)(1 + te)
1− τ
¶σj
j = 2, 3. (16)
We also use (13) in conjunction with (14) to get
l1
lj
= Bε
µ
Aj
A1
¶1−εµ
1 + t1
1 + tj
¶−ε
x1−ε/σjj , (17)
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with xj now given by (see (12))
xj =
"
1 +
µ
1− ψj
ψj
¶σj µAjh
Aj
(1 + tj)(1 + te)
1− τ
¶σj−1#σj/(σj−1)
. (18)
Looking first at (16) we find that the marketization of time depends on preference
parameters, technology and taxes. We define the “tax wedge” that applies to sector j
as twj by
twj = 1−
1− τ
(1 + tj)(1 + te)
. (19)
Note that if all tax rates are small numbers this is approximately equal to the conven-
tional tax wedge used in econometric studies, twj = τ + tj + te. But because taxes in
our sample can be large, this approximation is not usually good. The marketization
condition (16) implies that a sector with higher tax wedge will marketize less time, i.e.,
more of the output of sectors 2 and 3 will be produced at home. Moreover, the elasticity
with which the relative time allocation responds to 1− twj is constant and equal to the
elasticity of substitution between market and home goods. The closer substitutes they
are, the bigger the impact of the tax wedge.
Condition (17) also implies that if a sector has higher tax wedge, it will have less
market employment relative to sector 1, of which there are no home substitutes. This
is plausible since it says that when a sector has close home substitutes its market em-
ployment is aﬀected more by taxes than is the employment of a sector without home
substitutes. In addition, (17) says that the relative expenditure taxes on the two sectors
influence their relative employment levels. If a sector is subsidized more, or taxed less,
it will have a bigger employment level even when controlling for the marketization of
the sector.
We now turn to data on the allocation of hours to market sectors, which we already
discussed, and to time use surveys which give information on the allocation of time to
home production.
5 Policy and the allocation of time
It is clear now from the discussion of the model in the preceding section that we need to
construct a tax wedge for each sector and we need to obtain data on home production
for the countries in our sample. The underlying assumption to comparing outcomes with
the policy data is that in the 10-year period for which we are making the comparisons,
1995-2004, preferences and technology were about the same in the five countries in our
sample, so cross-sectional diﬀerences in the allocation of time can be accounted for by
policy diﬀerences. To the extent that either preferences or technology were not similar
there will be lack of good correlations between policy and outcomes, at least in the
simple charts that we use in this paper.
The tax rates in the model do not need further clarification, as empirical counterparts
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Table 5:
The net tax wedge, 1995-2004
sector US UK FR IT SW
non-health 0.29 0.33 0.45 0.45 0.53
health 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.40 0.08
are widely used in the literature.13 The employment subsidy includes all the money
governments spend to support employment, which appear in OECD statistics under the
heading active labour market policies. The three tax rates and the employment subsidy
are common to all sectors in the economy. The second subsidy is exclusively applied
to the health and social care sector. This subsidy includes only expenditure which are
specifically tied to the provision of social services, such as subsidized child care centres
and retirement homes. The employment subsidy is reported in the literature as total
money spent onmeasures to enhance employment as a percentage of GDP.We recalculate
it here as the ratio of total money spent to the aggregate wage bill and deduct it from
the employer tax rate. Thus, in terms of the notation of our model, te is now the OECD
employer tax series minus the ratio of active employment measures to the wage bill. The
social subsidy is applied specifically to one sector, so we derive the rate by dividing the
total money spent on this subsidy by the gross output of the sector. Let this subsidy
rate by s and let the gross expenditure tax rate be tg2.We assume that the net tax on this
sector is obtained from the product (1 + tg2)(1− s), the reasoning behind it being that
the consumer’s expenditure in this sector is subsidized at rate s and then the remaining
net spending is taxed at tg2. The net tax rate is then t2 = t
g
2 − s− stg2.14
The tax wedge for the first two sectors is the same but it is diﬀerent in the third,
because of the bigger subsidy that it receives. Table 5 reports the results of our cal-
culations. Looking first at the tax wedge in the economy outside the health and social
sector, the ranking and rates are at levels that one would expect. The United States
has the smallest tax wedge followed closely by the United Kingdom. Then come France
and Italy and finally Sweden, with the highest tax. But in the health and social sectors
rankings change. In Sweden the implicit tax is very small because of the large subsidy
received in the form of social services. The subsidy is much less in the other countries,
especially in Italy and the United States. Given the tax wedge elsewhere, the implicit
tax on social services is highest in Italy followed by France and then the United States
and Britain.
We finally turn to the allocation of time within the household. Household time
use surveys have proliferated recently but despite their widespread use they do not
always give consistent statistics. There are two harmonized sources that we could use
to get comparable cross-country data, the Multinational Time Use Survey (MUTS) and
13The original source is the OECD but an update that we use here is in the CEP/OECD data set.
See W. Nickell (2006).
14Because the rates tg2 and s are large in the countries in our sample, the results diﬀer somewhat
when t2 is simply set equal to the diﬀerence t
g
3 − s.
16
Table 6:
Weekly hours in time use surveys, ages 15-64
country and US UK FR IT SW
survey year 2003 2000 1998 2002 2001
market hours 31.4 27.5 24.5 25.9 31.0
all home hours 27.7 25.5 27.5 26.5 26.0
childcare 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.9 3.4
leisure 32.6 37.0 28.3 33.0 26.3
all work 59.1 53.0 52.0 52.5 57
Travel time is included in each category. All home work includes childcare. Education time is not
included. For Sweden only the age group is 20-64.
Eurostat (2005). MUTS have comparable data for the United States, United Kingdom
and France whereas Eurostat has comparable data for the four European countries. We
decided to use the Eurostat data for the European countries and MUTS for the United
States, although there are some diﬀerences in the numbers given for the two countries
that overlap the two data sets. Data for the population over 15 give similar results to
data for ages 15-64. We report data for the latter age groups only, to make it more
comparable to the hours of work data in section 3.
Market hours in time use surveys are always higher than in other sources. One reason
is that travel time to the place of work is counted as market hours in time use surveys.
But comparing the results in Table 6 with those in Table 2 we find a diﬀerence for the
five countries of 7.9, 2.9, 3.4, 3.9 and 7.4 hours per week respectively. The hours for
the US seem too high to be plausible as work-related travel time. For Sweden the large
diﬀerence might be explained partly by the fact that the time use survey refers to ages
20-64. We exclude education time from the Table. Sometimes researchers add education
time to market hours.
The row headed leisure gives the time that respondents say they are engaged in
leisure activities, the main one being watching television. The diﬀerence between the
numbers for all activities given in Table 6 and the total number of hours in the week is
taken up by “personal needs” (and education). The time taken up by personal needs
such as sleep and preparation for the day’s activities varies across some countries. For
example it is higher in France, and to a lesser extent Italy, than in the other countries.
We decided not to use the responses to the leisure activities question as our measure for
leisure but to work instead with a total work and education variable as the non-leisure
component of time. We felt that items such as how long one takes to get ready to go
out are not “needs” but partly preparation for leisure activities.
We report three sets of graphs, following our analysis in the preceding section. The
three sets are correlations between the policy variables and (a) total work, (b) the
fraction of time that is marketized, and (c) the number of hours in the sectors that have
home substitutes to the first and biggest sector. It cannot be overemphasized that with
only five countries these are simply correlations to check whether the general trends
suggested by the model have support in the data. They cannot be formal tests of any
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model of the impact policy.
The policy variable that influences total work is the ratio of the total transfer from
the government to the net wage rate. We constructed such a variable by taking all
government spending and then deducting the social spending and the gross output of
the administrative, military and compulsory social security sector. For total work we
have measures that are constructed entirely from time use surveys, that include market
work, home work and may or may not include education. The correlations between these
series and the policy variable are not very strong but they are in the general direction of
our preferred series for total work. The latter is a “leaner” series constructed by adding
market hours from KLEMS and home hours from time use surveys. The correlation
between it and the ratio of transfer to wages is shown in figure 4. The figure shows a
good correlation between all work and the government transfer for the four countries
excluding Sweden but Sweden, which has the biggest transfer, has more hours of work
than would be predicted by the other four countries’ experience. We will argue shortly
that Swedish policy is such that more hours are marketized than in the other countries.
In view of this, the puzzle with Sweden may not necessarily be why Swedes work so
many market hours given the large transfers, but why do they work so many home
hours, given the many market hours? Part of the explanation for this puzzle may be in
the fact that our Swedish time use data is for people aged 20-64 and the excluded group
of 15-19 year olds spends much less time on home production than other age groups.
But it is not likely to be the whole story because of the numbers involved.
Next we turn to the marketization issue. Our model predicts a log linear relation
between the ratio of market hours to home hours in a sector and one minus the tax
wedge; see (16) and (19). The slope of the relation is the elasticity of substitution
between home and market production in the sector. Figure 5 reports the correlation
between the marketization in the health and social care sector with its tax wedge. We
report also the equation for the line through the points to get a point estimate of the
slope. The correlation is strong. The only country that does not completely conform to
the model’s prediction is France, where there is too much marketization. The reason is
a very low number for home childcare in France in the one survey at our disposal. The
slope of the line in figure 5 is 2, which is in the middle of the range of estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between home and market goods found in the literature (see
Ngai and Pissarides, 2008).
Figure 6 reports the correlation between the marketization in the sector of “other
services” with its tax wedge. The reported correlation is reasonably good but not as
good as in the health and social care sector. The main deviation is again in French data,
but in contrast to the health and social care sector, here the marketization is too low,
given its tax wedge. The slope of the line through the points is 0.84, suggesting a rather
small elasticity of substitution between home and market production in these services.
However, this is the point estimate of a large range consistent with the five points in the
graph.
We finally turn to the model’s prediction about the ratio of market hours in sector 1
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and the other two sectors, shown in equation (17). Taking logs of this equation we find,
log
µ
l1
lj
¶
+ ε log
µ
1 + t1
1 + tj
¶
=
µ
1− ε
σj
¶
log xj + other variables. (20)
We then express log xj as a function of log(lhj/lj) for j = 2, 3 and other variables that
are functions of the parameters of preferences and technology. The interesting property
of the model when we write relative market hours as in equation (20) is that the ratio of
market hours in sector 1 to market hours in either sector 2 or sector 3 depends only on the
expenditure tax in the two sectors and in the marketization in sector 2 or 3. Moreover,
since the expenditure tax in sector 3 is the same as in sector 1, relative market hours in
sector 1 to sector 3 depend only on the marketization of sector 3.
Figure 7 shows the correlation between the left-hand side of (20) and the log of
home to market hours in sector 2. The coeﬃcient ε was set equal to 0.1, as in Ngai and
Pissarides (2008). The correlation between the two series is almost perfect. Interestingly,
the expenditure tax ratio in the left hand side contributes to this correlation. As ε is
increased in the plausible range given in Ngai and Pissarides (2008), from 0 to 0.3, the
correlation increases, reaching 0.997 at ε = 0.3. The main eﬀect of increasing ε is to
reduce the slope of the line, from 1 when ε = 0 to 0.88 when it is ε = 0.3.
Figure 8 repeats the correlation for sector 3, for other services. The correlation is not
as good as in the health and social care sector but it is still confirmation that the model’s
predictions are not violated by the data. There is clearly a positive association between
the ratio of market hours in sectors 1 and 3 and the non-marketization of services in
sector 3, as predicted by the model.
6 Conclusions
Our motivation in this paper was the idea that the policies that governments follow to
support social services influence the employment outcomes diﬀerently across sectors of
economic activity. We have shown that in a representative sample of countries the Anglo-
Saxon welfare policies of limited transfers and encouragement of market participation
lead to more employment overall, especially when compared to the continental European
policy of encouraging the family to look after dependents at home, through a more
extensive unconditional system of social transfers. Both contrast with the Scandinavian
policy of providing traditional family functions through market-based state-supported
activities. The outcome in our representative countries is that whereas both continental
European countries and Sweden have less employment in business services than Britain
and the United States, Sweden has more employment in health and social care than the
rest of the countries in the sample.
An obvious question is whether one welfare system is “better” than another, in
some general social welfare sense. There can be no answer to this question, at least
without specifying the welfare criteria. A first issue is the trade-oﬀ between market
incentives and social support. There is no doubt that there is strong support in Europe
for an elaborate system of social care. Anglo-Saxon systems encourage market activity
with limited provision for system failures such as low pay, long-term unemployment
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and disability. Whereas other European countries admire the market-based successes
of the Anglo-Saxon world, it is doubtful whether they would be prepared to sacrifice
their social support systems to achieve them. Contrasting the Anglo-Saxon system is
the Scandinavian system, which encourages more market participation of low skilled
workers, more equality and more women in the labour force, who become the providers
of market-based social services. But the Scandinavian system requires higher taxes,
which can be a disincentive to high-skill innovative activity.
A second issue is related to where society wants social services to take place. The
predominant social services that come under welfare support are caring services - for
children, the physically impaired and aged household members unable to look after
themselves. Continental European systems encourage home support for these services,
with the family given the main responsibility for looking after dependents. Scandinavian
policies “nationalize” these family functions, by giving incentives to the family to oﬀshore
them to the market. Ignoring the public finance implications, the outcome in terms of the
type of social service provided is diﬀerent. In our approach to preferences we treated the
outcomes as close but not perfect substitutes, and given our interest in the employment
outcomes assumed that preferences are common across countries. But for social welfare
comparisons preferences may diﬀer.
In terms of public finances, all welfare policies involve some distortion, which is
another factor in evaluating them. Continental European policies reduce the tax base
by shifting more services away from the market and distort the choice between home-
provided services and business services. For example, Italians work as much as the
British, but in Britain market work, especially by women, attracts many more hours
than in Italy. Because women have a comparative advantage in the supply of social
services, more Italian and French women stay at home in response to the incentives
given by their welfare systems, and more British and especially Swedish women enter
the labour force. On the plus side the tax base is large because social services are
moved to the market, but the subsidies needed to achieve this transfer are heavy and
are financed by taxing other services, especially high-income business services. The
implications of this for the location of services could become more disadvantageous for
the high tax countries as the European economy becomes more integrated.
Ultimately the question is how does a country choose to support lower incomes?
Anglo-Saxon policies encourage all market activity but Scandinavian policies encourage
more low-skill activity. They both help lower-skill workers through the market but
Scandinavian policies help them more through a system of subsidies. In this respect
continental transfer policies are the least eﬃcient because they push low-skill work to
the home and support low incomes with cash transfers, which are both distortionary
and reduce the tax base.
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